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Abstract 
This paper proposes  three theoretical growth models incorporating social 
capital, based on varied expositions on  the concept of  social capital and the 
empirical evidence gathered to date.  In these models, social capital impacts 
growth by assisting in the accumulation of  human capital, by affecting financial 
development  through its effects on  collective trust and social norms, and by 
facilitating networking between firms that result in the creation and diffusion 
of  business and technological innovations. We solve for the optimum allocation 
of  human capital or labor towards social capital formation in each model, and 
examine their comparative statics and transitional dynamics. 
KEYWORDS:  Economic Growth  Social Capital  Financial Development  Tech- 
nological Change Human Capital 
JEL CODES: 
I  Introduction 
. 
The concept of  social capital which refers to features of  social organizations  such as 
networks  norms and trust  that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit  has found increasing acceptance among economists in the last five years. Like 
other sociological concepts  its amorphous nature elicited initial skepticism among 
mainstream economists  who questioned the validity of classifying social interactions 
as a form of  capital.  Many economists now acknowledge that social capital shares 
similarities with physical and human capital in its intertemporal dimension and its 
ability to generate a stream of  future benefits.  The number of  papers on social 
capital being published in top-ranked economic journals  is perhaps the strongest 
indication of its rising respectability among economists. 
More importantly  the different facets of social capital have been demonstrated 
to have  a profound impact  on economic  development  and growth.  Indicators of 
social capital has been shown to affect local financial development as well as general 
economic growth in Italy. Many cross-country studies have shown the importance of 
trust in determining an economy's growth prospects.  Social capital has been shown 
to be correlated with superior outcomes in watershed conservation  in Rajasthan India [Krishna and Uphoff (2002)l  in agricultural trading in Madagascar [Fafchamps 
and Minten (2002)l  in community-based water projects in Central Java  Indonesia 
[Isham and Kahkonen (2002)l  and in voluntary solid waste management in Dhaka 
Bangladesh [Pargal  Gilligan  and Huq (2002)l. 
Despite the burgeoning  number of  empirical  studies on the economic impact 
of  social capital  there have been  few  attempts at building theoretical models of 
social capital and growth.  Zak and Knack (2001) construct a model where social 
constraints and formal institutions ameliorate the principal-agent  problem between 
investors and investment brokers by raising trust  thereby reducing the amount of 
unproductive time spent on inspecting investments. Glaeser  Laibson  and Sacerdote 
(2002)  model  an individual's  decision on the optimal amount of  social capital to 
invest  in  where the opportunity cost  of  time and occupational  returns to social 
skills are exogenously given. 
In this paper  we  propose  three growth  models  where social capital impacts 
growth by assisting in the accumulation of  human capital  by affecting financial de- 
velopment through its effects on collective trust and social norms  and by facilitating 
networking between firms that result in the creation and diffusion of  business and 
technological  innovations.  We solve for the optimum allocations of  human capital 
or labor towards the building of  social capital in each model  and examine their 
comparative statics and transitional dynamics. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the concept of  capital - its 
definition(s)  attributes and classifications. Section 3 reviews the extensive literature 
on the empirical relationship between social capital and growth. Sections 4  5 and 6 
are devoted to expositions of three theoretical models in which social capital impacts 
growth through the channels of  human capital accumulation  financial development 
and business innovations.  Section 7 concludes. 
2  The Concept of Social Capital 
2.1  Defining Social Capital 
What is social capital?  Like many sociological concepts  it is a broad one encom- 
passing  myriad definitions.  While some researchers define social capital in terms 
of  trust and norms of  civic cooperation  others define it in terms of  cultural values 
such as compassion  altruism and tolerance  while still others emphasize institutions 
and the quality and quantity of  LLassociational"  life.  To give the reader a flavor of 
this diversity  we  will examine three specific definitions  before examining the key 
attributes that are common to all social capital as well as the different ways in which 
social capital may be classified. 
According to Coleman (1990)  "What I mean by social capital in the raising of 
children is the norms  the social networks and the relationships between adults and 
children that are of  value for the child growing up.  Social capital exists within the 
family  but also outside the family  in the community ...  in the interest  even the 
intrusiveness  of  one adult in the activities of  someone else's  child."  Elaborating Coleman (1994) argues that  "social capital is the set of  resources that inhere in 
family relations and in community social organization and that are useful for the 
cognitive or social development of  a child or young per~on.~'(p.300)  Education, for 
Coleman, is the strongest expression of  the resources generated by the relationships, 
values, and trust that constitute social capital.  [Field, Schuller and Baron (2000)]. 
Putnam (1996) focuses on defining a different aspect of  social capital:  "By social 
capital I mean features of  social life - networks, norms, and trust -  that enable 
participants to act together  more effectively to pursue shared objectives."  (p.56) 
In his search for empirical evidence about changes in the stock of  social capital, 
Putnam (2000) identifies a general secular decline in levels of  social capital, despite 
a contemporary rise in educational levels, which is generally positively associated 
with civic participation. 
Maskell (2000) argues that "(s)ocial capital refers to the values and beliefs that 
citizens share in their everyday dealings and which give meaning and provide design 
for all sorts of rules.  The use of  the word 'capital'  implies we  are dealing with an 
asset. The word 'social' tells us that it is an asset attained through membership in a 
community." He believes that the formation of  social capital is often not a deliberate 
action:  "Social capital is  accumulated within the community through processes of 
interaction and learning ... Social capital is  at the same time in part accumulated as 
an unintended and even unanticipated  consequence of  economic activity as people 
often spend more of  their waking hours 'bowling'  with their workplace colleagues 
than with their family and friends."  Social capital, then, may arise in the commercial 
workplace as much as it does in civil society.  "Norms, codes, trust, solidarity and 
other vital elements of  social capital are built and reinforced when sharing a common 
goal or a mutual fate even in the most hierarchical economic structures imaginable, 
like the globally operating multidivisional corporation, and not just  when people 
mingle, organize and achieve with peers in their spare time."  (p.111) 
2.2  Key Attributes of Social Capital 
Social capital is capital because it is an accumul~ted  stock from which a stream of 
benefits flows. Social capital is therefore more than simply a set of  social organiza- 
tions or social va1ues.l  Social capital can directly enhance output or lead to higher 
productivity of  other resources, such as human and physical capital. 
However, as Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) point out, social capital exhibits 
several characteristics which distinguish it &om other forms of  physical capital. For 
example, like human capital but unlike physical capital, social capital may  accu- 
mulate as a result of its use.  That is, social capital is both an input into and an 
output of  collective action.  To the extent that social interactions are drawn upon 
to produce mutually beneficial output, the quality or quantity of  these interactions 
is  likely to rise.  In addition, although every other form of  capital has a potential 
productive impact in a typical Robinson Crusoe economy, social capital does not 
'Arrow  (2000) and Solow  (2000) are, however, skeptical about the "capital" aspect of  social 
capital,  Solow argues that  "behavior patterns" is a more appropriate term. - creating and activating social capital requires at least two people.  Social capital 
therefore has public good characteristics, so that it is  likely to be underproduced 
because of  incomplete collective internalization of  the positive externalities inherent 
in its production. 
On the other hand, social capital, like other forms of  capital, is not costless to 
produce and requires a significant amount of  time and effort, if  not always money. 
Trusting relationships among members of  a sports club, professional organization, 
or civic association often take a very long time to build.  Moreover, since trust is 
more easily destroyed than rebuilt, there is  a maintenance expense to social capital, 
often in the form of time. 
2.3  Classifying Social Capital 
2.3.1  The  Scope of Social Capital 
Social capital may exist on three levels.  At the micro level, social capital encapsu- 
lates features of  social organizations, such as networks of  individuals or households, 
and the associated norms and values that create externalities for the community as 
a whole [Putname (1993)l. It has come to be accepted that these externalities from 
interpersonal interactions may either be positive or negative. 
The analysis of  social capital at the meso level expands the concept of  social 
capital to include vertical as well as horizontal associations and behavior within and 
among other entities, such as firms.  Vertical associations are characterized by hi- 
erarchical relationships and an unequal power distribution among members. While 
bonding (or integrating) relationships take place within a group and facilitate inter- 
action and collective action within it, bridging (or linking) relationships strengthen 
linkages between the group and other organizations. 
The third and most encompassing view of  social capital includes the social and 
political environment that shapes social structure and enable norms to develop. This 
macro view includes the most formalized institutional relationships and structures, 
such as the political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political 
liberties.  Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) argue that there is  a strong degree of 
complementarity between horizontal and hierarchical associations and macro institu- 
tions, and that their coexistence maximizes the impact of social capital on economic 
and social outcomes.  However, in this paper, we  will not  attempt to model the 
relationship between macro level social capital (also known as "government social 
capital" or "social infrastructure"), as this has been done elsewhere, including Chin 
and Chou (2002). 
2.3.2  The Forms of Social Capital 
At each of the three levels explained above, social capital affects economic growth as 
a result of  the interactions between two distinct types of  social capital - shctural 
social capital and cognitive social capital, As noted by Grootaert and van Bastelaer 
(2002), structural social capital facilitates information sharing and collective action and decision-making through established roles  and social networks supplemented 
by  rules, procedures and precedents.  Cognitive social capital, on the other hand, 
refers to shared norms, values, trust, attitudes and beliefs, and is a more subjective 
and  intangible concept.  Krishna  (2000) terms the first type of  social capital  as 
"institutional capital" and the second as "relational capital". 
The two forms of social capital are often complementary. For example, cooper- 
ation between parents who are neighbors are based on a cognitive bond, and may 
also be reflected in a formal structural arrangement if they are both deeply involved 
in the parents-teachers association of  the local school. 
2.3.3  The Channels of  Social Capital 
Like other forms of  capital, social capital represents an asset or a class of  asset that 
produces a stream of  benefit.  The streams of  benefits, or channels through which 
it impacts development, includes elements such as information sharing and mutu- 
ally beneficial collective action and decision-making.  These benefits then lead to 
higher incomes for households, communities, and nations. Besides serving as forums 
for information exchange, networks and associations facilitate collective action and 
decision-making by  increasing the costs of  non-compliance. 
In this paper, social capital will be shown to produce economic growth by fa- 
cilitating the accumulation of  human capital, the creation and diffusion of  business 
innovations, and enabling financial development which increases capital accumula- 
tion. 
3  Empirical Evidence on Social Capital and Growth 
As stated in the introduction, there is now an extensive literature linking the dif- 
ferent facets of  social capital to economic performance.  Some studies have tracked 
changes in the stock of  social capital, some have attempted to identify the deter- 
minants of  an individual's investment in social capital, while others have examined 
the importance of  civic community, membership in associations, and ethnic horno- 
geneity in promoting economic growth.  There have also been many studies on the 
determinants of  trust, and the impact of  trust on investment and growth. 
3.1  Trends in Social Capital 
Costa and Kahn  (2001) evaluate trends in social capital since 1952 and assess ex- 
planations for observed declines. They find that:  (1) declines in social capital have 
been somewhat overstated, with small declines in probability of  volunteering, larger 
declines in group membership, and still larger declines in probability of  entertaining 
since 1970s; (2) there is no decline in the probability of  spending frequent evenings 
with friends and relatives, but decreases in daily visits with friends and relatives; 
(3) rising community heterogeneity (especially income inequality) explains the fall in social capital produced outside the home; and (4) the rise in women's labor force 
participation rates explains the decline in social capital produced within the home. 
3.2  Determinants of Investment in Social Capital 
In Gleaser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2000), social capital is  defined as  a person's 
social characteristics,  including social skills and charisma,  which  enables him to 
reap market  and non-market returns from interaction with others.  Individual so- 
cial capital may  thus be seen as the social component  of  human capital.  Using 
responses to organization membership questions  from the General Social Survey 
(1972-98) with repeated cross sections of  1200-2500 respondents, the authors find 
evidence supporting the individual-based model of  social capital formation.  Their 
findings include:  (1) the relationship between social capital and age is increasing 
and then decreasing; (2) social capital declines with expected mobility; (3) social 
capital investment is higher in occupations with greater returns to social skills (low 
social skills occupations include textile operatives, and billing clerks, while high so- 
cial skills occupations include physicians and clergymen); (4) people who invest in 
human capital also invest in social capital; and (5) social capital appears to have in- 
terpersonal complementaries: people who belong to groups with more social capital 
tend to invest more in social capital themselves. 
3.3  Civic Community and Government Performance 
Helliwell and Putnam (1995) provide a rigorous test of  Putnam's (1993) hypothesis 
on the role of  social capital in accounting for variations in economic performance in 
different parts of Italy. Three alternative regional indicators of  social capital (citizen 
satisfaction with local government, performance, and an index of  "civic community" 
based on four components:  newspaper reading, number of  sports and cultural or- 
ganizations, turnout in referendums, and the incidence of  preference voting)  are 
positively and significantly related to growth over  the 1950-90 period, controlling 
for 1950 per  capita income. 
3.4  Group Membership 
Knack and Keefer (1997) attempt to test the conflicting theories of  Putnam (1993) 
and Olson (1982) on the desirability of high membership in horizontal, non-hierarchical 
associations.  Putnam believes that these associations are a source of  trust and of 
social ties conducive to economic performance while Olson emphasizes their growth- 
impeding, rent-seeking functions, In Barro-type regressions, Knack and Keefer find 
that group memberships are unrelated to growth and negatively related to invest- 
ment rates, thus offering little support to either Putnam or Olson.  Disaggregating 
groups into those that seem to have primarily social goals ("Putnam groups") and 
those that are more likely to engage in lobbying ("Olson groups") proves not to offer 
Olson additional support, while Putnam groups actually show a strong but negative 
association with investment. 3.5  Social Polarization 
Several studies focus on ethnic divisions and inequality as sources of slower growth 
through their effects on trust, social cohesion, economic policymaking, and violent 
conflict.  Easterly and Levine (1997) show that more ethnically heterogeneous so- 
cieties grow more slowly than others, controlling for the usual growth regressors, 
Ethnic heterogeneity  is correlated with a range of indicators of  inefficient policies, 
including a high  black market  premium,  high levels of  corruption,  low  schooling 
rates, a lack of  financial development, and poor infrastructure.  In Zak and Knack 
(2001), the strength of informal sanctions against cheating weakens with social dis- 
tance, increasing monitoring costs of contractual agreements between investor-broker 
pairs. 
Knack and Keefer (1997), using indicators of trust and civic norms from the World 
Values Survey, finds that a one-standard deviation increase in a survey-based mea- 
sure of  country-level trust increases economic gowth by more than half a standard 
deviation.  However, they find that memberships  in formal groups is  not  associ- 
ated with trust or improved economic performance.  In addition, trust and civic 
norms are stronger in countries with higher  (and more equal) incomes, and with 
better-educated and more ethnically homogeneous populations.  La Porta, Lopez- 
de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997) obtain similar results to Knack and Keefer 
(1997). 
Zak  and Knack  (2001) present  a general equilibrium  growth model in which 
investors of  varying types (defined by ethnicity, class, age, or other differences) are 
randomly matched each  period  with  brokers  of  varying  types in order to access 
credit  markets.  Only  brokers know  actual investment  returns,  creating a  moral 
hazard problem.  Before investments are closed out in  the second period, brokers' 
types are revealed and consumers decide on how much time to spend investigating 
the broker.  In the model, trust declines with differences in type between those of  an 
investor and a broker. In empirical tests, Zak  and Knack report that trust is higher 
in countries with stronger formal institutions for enforcing contracts and reducing 
corruption and in countries with less-polarized populations (as measured by income 
or land inequality, ethnic homogeneity, and intensity of  economic discrimination). 
They also show that formal institutions and polarization appear to affect growth 
rates partly through their effect on trust. 
3.7  Related Research 
Temple and Johnson  (1998) find a correlation between the Adelman-Morris index 
of social development (incorporating factors such as extent of urbanization, kinship, 
social mobility, literacy, and extent of mass communications) and economic growth. 
Their results  are robust to exclusion of  some factors from the index and to the inclusion of human capital and fertility variables. Temple and Johnson characterize 
their index of  social development as a proxy for  "social capability". 
4  Social Capital and Human Capital 
The impact of  civil society, the way  individuals in a society work together for com- 
mon purposes, on the education and raising of children has long been recognized by 
social scientists. More recently in the US, Sen. Hillary Clinton has greatly increased 
public awareness of  this issue in releasing a book based on the old African proverb, 
"It takes a village to raise a child".  In the introduction to her book, Clinton reminds 
that us that raising a child well involves activities that draw time away from market 
activities, such as talking to a baby while changing a diaper, playing airplane to 
entice a toddler to accept a spoonful of food, and tossing a ball back and forth with 
a teenager.  She acknowledges that social capital that comes from participation in 
community groups and activities has diminished in contemporary society - member- 
ship in civic associations, churches, union, political parties, and even bowling leagues 
have all experienced significant decline in America. In today's digital age, the 'vil- 
lage'  defies geographical boundaries - it is the network of  values and relationships 
that support and affect our lives,  Becker  (1993) also acknowledges that "(n)o dis- 
cussion of  human capital can omit the influence of  families on the knowledge, skills, 
values, and habits of  children ...  Therefore, even small differences among children in 
the preparation provided by their families are frequently multiplied over time into 
large differences ..."  (p.21). 
4.1  Background 
Among social scientists, James S. Coleman was a pioneer in making explicit reference 
to the concept  of  social capital in  evaluating society's  impact  on human  capital 
accumulation.  According to Coleman (1988), social capital comes about through 
changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action.  Less tangible than 
physical or even hunian capital, it exists in the relations among persons. However, 
like the first two forms of  capital, it facilitates productive activity.  For  example, a 
group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to 
accomplish much more than a comparable group without these attributes. 
Coleman argues that social relations constitute useful capital resources for indi- 
viduals in several ways. Firstly, social relations may be characterized by obligations 
and expectations that rely on and enhance trustworthiness.  For example, if  A does 
something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this establishes an expec- 
tation in A and an obligation on the part of  B.  This obligation may be conceived 
as a credit  slip held  by  A for performance by  B.  These credit slips constitute a 
large body of credit that A can call in if  required, unless the placement of  trust was 
betrayed  and the debt repudiated.  Secondly, social relations serve as information 
channels for individuals. In the context of  childraising and human capital accumula- 
tion, two parents who see each other as neighbors may exchange information about their teenagers'  activities. 
4.1.1  The  Importance of Closure in Social Networks 
Social relations may lead to the establishment of norms and provide effective sanc- 
tions if  they are violated.  Effective norms, in turn, requires the 'closure'  of  social 
networks. In the case of  social capital assisting in the accumulation of  human capi- 
tal, the imposing of norms by parents on children requires intergenerational closure. 
Colloquially,  in  a community with substantial social capital, the parents'  friends 
are the parents of  their children's friends.  This is distinct from the high degree of 
closure among children as peers (who see each other daily, have expectations toward 
each other, and develop norms about each other's  behavior),  which exists even in 
communities with little social capital.  The consequence of  intergenerational closure 
is  a set of  effective sanctions that can monitor and guide behavior.  Parents can 
discuss their children's activities and come to some consensus about standards and 
about sanctions.  Parents of  students from the same school who are willing to sac- 
rifice time away from market activities reinforce one another in sanctioning their 
children's  actions.  Each parent  constitutes a monitor not only for his or her own 
child but also for those of  another,  Intergenerational closure therefore provides a 
quantity of social capital available to each parent in raising his or her children, not 
only in matters related to school but also in other matters. 
4.1.2  Family Background and Human Capital Accumulation 
In Coleman's view, the family background of  a student affects his or her accumu- 
lation of  skills and knowledge in three ways.  Financial capital, approximated by 
the family's wealth or income, provides physical resources that can aid achievement: 
a fixed place in the home for studying, materials to aid learning, and financial re- 
sources that smooth family problems.  Human capital, approximately measured by 
parents' education, provides the potential for a cognitive environment for the child 
that aids learning, thus validating the inclusion of spillover effects from the existing 
stock of  human capital in the Lucas (1988) specification of  the human capital ao 
cumulation equation.  However, this human capital may be irrelevant to outcomes 
for children if  parents are not an important part of  their children's  lives, if  their 
human capital is employed exclusively at work or elsewhere outside the home.  That 
is, human capital possessed by parents that is not complemented by social capital 
embodied in family relations is irrelevant to their child's educational growth. 
4.1.3  Empirical Evidence 
Coleman (1988) provides empirical evidence that the presence of social capital within 
the family is especially important in determining whether a child drops out of school. 
He uses the number of  siblings, which measures the dilution of  adult attention to a 
child, as a proxy for social capital. In addition, Coleman (1988) also find that social 
capital outside the family has a significant impact on the dropping out decision. Students who have changed schools because their parents moved are more likely to 
drop out than their peers.  For families that have moved often, the social relations 
that constitute social capital are broken at each move.  Whatever the degree of 
intergenerational closure available to others in the community, Coleman argues, is 
not  available to parents in mobile families.  More significantly from our point  of 
view, Coleman finds that dropout rates are lower in religiously based private schools 
than in public or secular private schools.  Whether parents devote time to pursue 
religion-related activities (which may include social functions), it appears, affects 
human capital accumulation in their offspring. 
Finally, Coleman (1988) clearly recognizes the public good aspect of  social cap 
ital. The kinds of social structures that enable social norms and the sanctions that 
enforce them do not benefit primarily the person or persons whose efforts would be 
necessary to bring them about, but benefit all those who are part of such a structure. 
Coleman gives the example of a dense set of  associations among some parents in cer- 
tain schools. These are the result of  a small number of  persons, ordinarily mothers 
who do not hold full-time jobs outside the home.  However, these mothers themselves 
experience only a subset of  the benefits of  this so~ial  capital surrounding the school. 
Should one of  them choose to abandon these activities to take a full time job,  the 
withdrawal of  these activities constitutes a loss to all those other parents whose as- 
sociations and contacts are dependent on them.  Because of  these externalities, there 
will generally be underinvestment  in social capital.  Coleman pessimistically notes 
that as the social structural conditions that overcome the problems of  supplying 
these public goods - strong families and strong communities - promises to be even 
less present in the future than now, social capital will become ever more deficient in 
the absence of  concerted policy changes and actions. 
4.2  The Formal Model 
In our  growth  model  with  human  and  social  capital,  there  are  many  identical 
infinitely-lived agents. Each agent faces a trade-off between devoting resources (hu- 
man capital, specifically) to final goods production (which enables current consump 
tion), to human capital accumulation (real world translation:  "teaching in a school" 
or being spending time acquiring new skills and knowledge), and to building social 
capital (being involved in parent-teacher associations, or spending time with his/her 
"kids" - notwithstanding the stilted analogy that afflicts representative agent mod- 
els!)  The last activity produces no income by itself but increases the effectiveness of 
human capital accumulation. 
The formal model that we  propose therefore incorporates the following key el- 
ements:  (1) the building or accumulation of social capital requires resources to be 
diverted from other productive uses;  (2) social capital may decay over time with- 
out new "investment" in social capital; (3) the existing stock of social capital has 
spillover effects on the building of new social capital; (4) social capital has a positive 
impact of  human capital accumulation; (5) human capital has positive intertemporal 
spillovers in its accumulation; and (6) human capital is an important input in final goods production. 
Mathematically, the model may be summarized as follows: 
K  =  Y-C-bKK, 
H  =  E (uH~ll-+  S* -  SHH, 
S  =  P(U~H)~-~S~  -bss, 
Y  =  AK" (uyH)l-", 
where K is the aggregate physical capital stock, Y is aggregate output, C is aggregate 
consumption, H is the stock of  human capital, S is the stock of  social capital, bK is 
the physical capital depreciation rate, b~  is the human capital depreciation rate, bs 
is the social capital depreciation rate, A, E and P are productivity constants, and 
a, o  and .1G)  are elasticity parameters constrained to lie on the (0,l) interval. 
The above equations describe the evolution of  the physical, human, and social 
capital stocks respectively. 
4.2.1  The Decentralized, Competitive Model 
Firms seek to maximize profits, ny, by choosing the optimal allocation of  labor, uy, 
and the optimal amount of  physical capital, K : 
max  AK" (uyH)l-" -  wyuyH -  rKK, 
where wy is the wage rate in the final goods sector and rx is the rental price of 
capital. 
Optimizing firms equate the marginal products of  labor and capital to the wage 
rate and the rental price of  capital respectively: 
Individuals seek to maximize lifetime utility subject to constraints, that is: 
subject to 
where w~ is the prevailing wage  in the human capital sector, PH is the price of 
each unit  of  new  human  capital  (think of  this  as school fees  in the real world), and fi = PSS. That is, individuals do not  internalize the externalities that their 
formation of  social capital confer on the accumulation of  social capital by others. 
This is  the public good aspect  of  social capital that we  discussed earlier.  Note, 
however, that individuals fully recognize the impact of  social capital accumulation 
on human capital accumulation. (Indeed, this may be their sole motive for building 
social capital!) 
We impose constant returns to scale on the production functions for & and S, 
so that the ratio of  these two form of capital is constant in the steady state (that 
is, on the balanced growth path). In addition, we  assume that educational services 
are priced so that they exactly cover the labor  costs of  providing such services, 
that is P~H  =  wHuHH. Lastly, for simplicity's sake, we  assume that social capital 
itself does not give pleasure to the individual and is thus excluded from the utility 
function. 
4.2.2  Solutions 
We  define the following variables that are constant in the steady state or the bal- 
anced growth path k r  K/H (the physical capital-human capital ratio), s  S/H 
(the social capital-human capital ratio), c  C/H (the consumption-human capital 
ratio), and 9  Y/H (the output-human capital ratio). 
As shown in the Appendix, the solution to the model is: 
*1-1C1,*$6.  Define the implicit function f (7;)  =  0, where f (yk) z 7;  +  SH -  EuH 
We  solve numerically for y$  after substituting the above expressions for u$,  u;, 
and s*. Once y& is found, it can be substituted back into these same expressions to 
obtain u&, u:,  and s*.  Furthermore, 
We  can show  that the competitive solution  results in an under-allocation  of 
human capital to the accumulation of  social capital. In particular, we  can show that 
in the social planner's solution, Table 1: Effect of  Parameters on the Steady-State Growth Rate 
Clearly u;/ub is larger in the social planner's  solution since cr (rfi  +  Ss)  > 0.  We 
can also show that a subsidy towards social capital formation financed by a lump sum 
tax will increase an individual's allocation of  human capital towards social capital 
accumulation. 
4.2.3  Comparative Statics 
In this section, we  examine the impact of  changes in the various parameters of  the 
model on the steady state growth rate as the well as the steady state allocations of 
human capital to the three sectors of  the model.  Figure 1  shows that the steady 
state growth rate is increasing in 8, the risk aversion parameter, and p, the rate of 
time preference.  Since social capital and human capital accumulation create long 
run growth but requires a short run sacrifice of  consumption, a higher discount rate 
results in lower investment in social and human capital, and therefore lower long run 
growth.  The steady state growth rate is increasing in the productivity parameters 
of the human capital and social capital accumulation equations, E and P,  as well as 
the social capital spillover parameter in the social capital accumulation equation, a. 
More interestingly, there is a U-shaped relationship between the steady state growth 
rate and the social capital elasticity parameter in the human capital accumulation 
equation, $I.  Because of  the constant returns to scale production functions for H 
and S, the steady-state growth rate of  the economy is higher at very low and very 
high values of $I than at intermediate values. 
Table 2 shows the response of the steady-state allocation of  human capital across sectors of  the model to changes in various parameters. An increase in the discount 
rate or  the risk aversion parameter  in the utility function results in more human 
capital being allocated in the steady state to final goods production, and less being 
allocated to human capital and social capital accumulation.  This is because final 
goods production brings instant gratification (through consumption) while human 
capital and social capital accumulation only increases future consumption. 
An increase in the spillover parameter in the social capital accumulation equa- 
tion, u,  which measures the positive externalities of current social capital production 
on future social capital accumulation, causes more human capital to be allocated to 
final goods production and less to either human capital or social capital accumula- 
tion.  This is to ensure that physical capital (whose accumulation depends on the 
production of  the final good) grows at the same rate as human capital and social 
capital in the steady state. An increase in the social capital elasticity parameter in 
the human capital accumulation equation, +,  increases the steady state allocation 
of human capital to final goods production and social capital accumulation, and 
decreases the allocation to human capital accumulation. 
Finally, an increase in the productivity parameters in the human capital and 
social capital accumulation equations (E and P  respectively) results in a greater 
steady state allocation of  human capital to final goods production and a reduced 
allocation to both social capital and human capital formation. An increase in E and 
P enables more new human capital to be produced for any given allocation of human 
capital across the three sectors, directly in the case of  E, and indirectly through 
social capital in  the case of  P.  However, the constancy  of  the physical capital- 
human capital ratio, k, in the steady state then requires more human capital to be 
channeled into final goods production, which in turn raises capital accumulation. 
4.2.4  Transitional Dynamics 
In this section, we  examine the impact of  increases in the productivity parameters 
governing the production of  human  and social capital.  In order to present  the 
transitional dynamics of  the model graphically in the form of  phase diagrams, it is 
necessary to reduce the complexity and dimensionality of  the model by assuming a 
constant saving rate and an exogenous allocation of human capital across the three 
sectors.  (That is, we  assume us and u~ to be exogenously given.)  The dynamics of 
the model then reduces to equations characterizing the 9 =  0 and k =  0 conditions 
respectively: 
The phase diagram of  the simplified model in k, s space is depicted in the top 
panel of Figure 3. The lower left panel in Figure 3 shows the impact of  an increase Table 2:  Effect of  Parameters on Steady-State Human Capital Allocation S 
Phase Diagram (0  > $) 
S 
Phase Diagram (a  <  .JI) 
S  S 
Effect of  an Increase in E (a  > $)  Effect of  an Increase in P (a  >  $1 
Table 3:  Transitional Dynamics 
in the productivity parameter of the human capital accumulation equation, E, while 
the lower right panel shows the impact of  an increase in the productivity parameter 
of the social capital accumulation equation, P. 
An increase in E causes both the physical capital-human capital ratio, k,and the 
social capital-human capital ratio, s,  to decrease. On the other hand, an increase in 
P causes both k and s to increase. 
5  Social Capital and Financial Development 
A second channel through which social capital may impact economic growth is  fi- 
nancial development. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2000) provide evidence of  this 
channel by exploiting well known differences  in social capital and trust across differ- 
ent parts of  Italy and using micro data on households and firms.  Controlling for a 
large set of household characteristics and other environmental variables such as the 
quality of legal enforcement and GDP per capita, they find that in areas of country with high social trust, people invest less in cash and more in stock, use more checks, 
have greater access to institutional credit, and make less use of  informal credit,  In 
these areas, firms also have more access to credit and are more likely to have multi- 
ple shareholders. In addition, the effect of  trust is stronger where legal enforcement 
is weaker and among less-educated people. 
5.1  The Model 
In our proposed model, social capital affects growth by  increasing the efficiency of 
the financial sector in transforming household or  individual savings into productive 
investments by firms in the final goods sector.  The accumulation process for social 
capital is similar to that in our first model except for replacing human capital with 
raw labor.  Individuals may  devote time to non-market activities such as pzbrtici- 
pating in clubs and associations which raises the level of  generalized trust in the 
community.  This in turn spurs the development of  financial institutions which pro- 
vide better intermediation between the needs of  savers and those of  borrowers, as 
documented in Guiso et a1  (2000). 
Specifically, the quantity of  social capital per worker, S/L,  determines the frac- 
tion of  savings that is transformed into new productive capital. The relationship is 
allowed to be a non-linear one through the inclusion of  the parameter  L: 
where L  denotes  the stock of  labor  (or number  of  workers), uy  and us denote 
the allocation of  labor to final goods production  and social capital accumulation 
respectively, A and P are productivity parameters, and a is parameter constrained 
to lie on the (0,l) interval. In addition, L > 0. 
5.1.1  Solutions 
We define the following variables which are constant in the steady state:  k G K/L 
(physical capital per worker), s s  S/L (social capital per worker), c m C/L  (con- 
sumption per worker), and y =  Y/L  (output per worker). 
The steady-state solutions are shown in the Appendix to be: Proposition 1  We  can show that au:/ap  <  0, au>/a~  > 0, and au>/aP =  0.  That 
is, the steady state allocation of labor to social capital accumulation is decredsing in 
the discount rate but increasing in the scale returns parameter in the tmnsfonnation 
of savings into investment, and is independent of  the productivity  parameter in the 
social  capital accumulation equation. 
Proof. Using equation (1  I), 
since ar/ap =  0, a@/ap  > 0 and r >  0.  In  addition, 
since ar/& >  0, a@/a~  =  0, and  >  0. Finally, 
since ar/aP =  0 and a@/aP  =  0. 
Proposition 2 In the steady state, social capital per worker, s, is decreasing in  the 
discount rate, p,  and  increasing in the productivitgl  pammeter in the social  capital 
accumulation equation, P. 
Proof. From equation (13) and using Proposition 1, 
Similarly, 
as*  1  p  1-0  --  UP)  I  >O Proposition 3  Physical  capital per  worker, k, and  output per  worker, y,  are in- 
creasing in the productivity  parameter in the social  capital  accumulation equation, 
P, in the steady state. 
Proof.  From equation (14), k*  is increasing in s*.  Since we  showed previously 
that ds*/dP > 0, it follows that dk*/dP > 0. Note that u> is independent of  P 
since u> = 1 -  u; and aui/aP =  0. From the production function, y* =  ~k*~u&-". 
Therefore, dy*/dP >  0.  rn 
5.1.2  Transitional Dynamics 
As in our previous model, we  assume a fixed saving rate and an exogenous allocation 
of  labor in order to present  a phase diagram of  this  model  in  k,  s  space.  The 
top left and top right panels in Figure 4 depict the two  possible phase diagrams, 
depending on the relative magnitudes of  the parameters  L and a. The lower panel 
in the same figure show the paths  of  k  and  s following a positive shock to the 
productivity parameter in the social capital accumulation equation, P. Both k and 
s rise smoothly to their higher  levels in the steady state, confirming Propositions 
2-3. 
6  Social Capital and Innovation 
6.1  Social Capital and High-Technology Firms 
In developed economies, the "new economy" of  the 1990s and the new millennia has 
seen a distinct trend towards inter-organizational linkages in the form of  partner- 
ships and consortia. Many firms and industries have formed productive collaborative 
relationships with other firms, laboratories, universities, and local and national gov- 
ernments to leverage the benefits of  cooperation (which include shared resources, 
group problem-solving, multiple sources of learning, collaborative development, and 
diffusion of  innovation),  The reason for this is that the investments required to 
sustain technology development and deployment have increased so much that single 
firms are often unable to undertake the level of  risk necessary for innovation. More- 
over, large, centralized bureaucracies emphasizing division of  labor and functional 
specialiiation have devolved into smaller, leaner organizations where team-based 
structures cross functional lines, disrupt traditional hierarchical chains of  command, 
and focus on core functions while contracting with outside firms for other tasks. 
Fountain (1998) argues that gains in economic performance and innovative ca- 
pacity depend on the institutional effectiveness  of  these relationships as measured 
by  the stock of  social capital available,  Social capital is  created when a group of 
organizations develops the ability to work together for mutually productive gain. 
The relationships between the organizations may be horizontal among similar firms 
in associations, vertical in supply chains, and multidirectional in their linkages to 
sources of  technical knowledge, human resources, and public agencies. S  S 
Phase Diagram (L > 1 -  a)  Phase Diagram (L < 1 -  a) 
S 
Effect of an Increase in P (L > 1 -  a) 
Table 4:  Transitional Dynamics Fountain emphasizes that social capital is derived from perspectives in which co- 
operation paradoxically enhances competitiveness, information sharing leads to  joint 
gains, and the importance of  reputation and trust ensure reciprocity and fair play 
within a given network.  Social capital encompasses well-functioning partnerships, 
consortia and networks.  Capital is located both in the sharable resources held by 
individual institutions in a network as well  as the overall structure among the in- 
stitutions in the network. Social capital is preserved by careful selection of  network 
players and strict sanctioning of  inappropriate (network-destroying) behaviors. 
Fountain gives two examples of  high-performance network structures that have 
developed significant levels of trust. The first describes the ways in which firms in 
the biotechnology industry partner to remain at the forefront of  research and de- 
velopment.  The second examines the dynamics that undergird regional industrial 
systems, as exemplified by the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley.  She writes: 
"One of the best-known examples of  a high-performing industry network is the com- 
puter industry in Silicon Valley, California. The professional culture is highly collab- 
orative.  Non-proprietary professional and technical information is regularly shared 
among employees and companies. Professionals regularly telephone and e-mail one 
another for assistance concerning specific technical problems. Professionals meet so- 
cially and discuss technical issues.  Employment mobility of  professional employees 
is unusually high relative to other industries. Nevertheless, among competing firms 
and professionals, the level of  competition is fierce."  (p.99) 
6.2  Social Capital and Traditional Firms 
According to Maskell (2000), social capital facilitates the 'low-tech'  learning and 
innovation that takes place when firms in traditional industries are innovative in how 
they handle and develop resource management, logistics, production, organization, 
marketing, sales, distribution, industrial relations, and other tasks and activities.  He 
argues that much of  this is due to inter-firm learning.  Pure market interactions by 
themselves are often incapable of  facilitating this due to the problem of  asymmetric 
information.  For  example, potential buyers of  information want  to ascertain the 
merit of  knowledge offered for sale.  But when fully informed of  the content of the 
knowledge offered, it has in effect acquired it for free.2 
Maskell argues that these market failures for the exchange of knowledge between 
firms can only be overcome when open market  relations are superseded by stable 
and reciprocal exchange arrangements based  on trust.  Trust  will  characterize  a 
relation between firms when each is confident that the other's present  value of  all 
foreseeable future exchanges exceeds the possible benefits of  breaking the relation. 
The key argument here is that the time and resources needed to build a relationship 
varies with the stock of social capital that the firms in question might attain through 
membership in a community. However, "(w)e still know very little about the actual 
process by which social capital is produced  and accumulated,  beyond suspecting 
'This problem was recognized in Arrow  (1970). that it might be a mainly unanticipated consequences of  doing something else - just 
like, for instance, learning by doing."  (p.  114) 
6.3  The Formal Model 
In this model, innovation or the creation of  new technology follows a process sim- 
ilar  to Romer  (1990) and Jones  (1995).  The rate of  innovation  depends on the 
allocation of  labor to the R&D sector as well as the effect of  spillovers from past 
innovation activities.  (We can therefore write down a similar decentralized, compet- 
itive model with rigorous microeconomic underpinnings, where R&D firms produce 
new blueprints that are sold to intermediate goods producers,  which  in turn sup 
ply intermediate goods to firms producing the final, consumption good.)  However, 
here the rate of  innovation also depends on the stock of  social capital in the econ- 
omy. In turn, social capital (unlike our first two models) is created partly through 
learning-by-doing as an unintended consequence of firms simply engaging in produc- 
tive activities. However, in order to leverage the social capital that is embodied in 
the types of  networks described previously, firms do have to invest at least some la- 
bor resources towards seeking suitable network partners and identifying productive 
collaborative  activities.  The equations of  motion for physical capital,  technology 
and social capital are: 
where A denotes technology,  denotes the aggregate physical capital stock that 
each firm takes as being exogenously given, B and P  are productivity  constants, 
and a,P,  q,  $, o,  4, and X are elasticity parameters constrained to lie on the (0,l) 
interval. 
6.3.1  The Solution 
The growth rates of  technology and social capital on the balanced growth path are: 
We can show algebraicd~  that both 7;  and y$ are increasing in the elasticity 
parameters of  the A and s  equations: p, A,  CT, $, and 4. 
Defining the following variables that are constant in the steady state, % E  K/AL 
(physical capital per effective unit of labor), s = SIL (social capital per worker),F = C/AL  (consumption per effective unit of labor), and  = Y/AL  (output per effect 
unit of  labor), the solution to the model is shown (in the Appendix) to be: 
6.3.2  Comparative Statics 
In this section, we  examine the impact of  changes in the various parameters of  the 
model on the steady state allocations of labor to the production of final goods, the 
creation of  innovations, and the accumulation of  social capital.  The top panels in 
Figure 5 shows that a larger risk aversion pyameter, 8,  and a larger discount rate, 
p,  is  associated with a greater  allocation of  labor to the final goods sector, and 
correspondingly smaller allocations to the other sectors. 
The middle left panel in Figure 5 shows that the social capital spillover parameter 
in the A equation has a negative relationship with the allocation of  labor to final 
goods production, uy;  a positive relationship with the allocation of  labor to social 
capital accumulation, us, and hump-shaped relationship with the fraction of  the 
labor force allocated to innovation creation, UA.  The middle right panel in Figure 5 
shows that the innovation spillover parameter in the the A equation has a negative 
relationship with the allocation of  labor to final goods production,  tiy; a hump- 
shaped relationship with the allocation of  labor to social capital accumulation, us, 
and a positive relationship with the fraction of  the labor force allocated to innovation 
creation, UA. 
The bottom panels in Figure 5 show that a larger social capital spillover pa 
rameter  (4) or  a larger physical capital learning-by-doing effect  (A)  in the social Table 5:  Effect of  Parameters on Steady State Labor Allocation 
capital accumulation equation results in a greater steady state allocation of  labor 
to both innovation creation and social capital accumulation, at the expense of labor 
allocated to final goods production. 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper, we  first discussed the concept of  social capital -  its definitions, at- 
tributes and classifications. This was followed by a review of recent empirical studies 
on the link between social capital and economic growth. We then proposed three the- 
oretical growth models incorporating social capital, based on different perspectives 
on the concept of social capital and the available empirical evidence. 
In the first model, social capital impacts growth by assisting in the accumulation 
of  human capital. Building social capital in this model corresponds to parents taking time off from work or even staying at home with their children, and involving them- 
selves in parent-teachers associations.  In the second model, social capital impacts 
growth by affecting financial development through its effects on collective trust and 
social norms.  Social capital accumulation in this model corresponds to participation 
in community clubs or  engaging in other forms of  associational activities.  In our 
last model, social capital arises from networking and collaborative activities that 
firms engage in, which result in a more efficient creation and diffusion of  business 
and technological innovations. In each of  these models, we  solved for the optimum 
steady-state allocations of  human capital or labor towards the creation and main- 
tenance of  social capital, and examined their comparative statics as well  as their 
transitional dynamics. The implications for public policy were also discussed. 
Future research possibilities include the construction of  an overlapping genera- 
tions model of  fertility, human capital, and growth which incorporates social capital. 
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A  Solving the Models 
A.1  Social Capital and Human Capital 
The Harniltonian corresponding to the individual's optimization  problem is given 
by: where c, uy and 'UH  are control variables; K,  H, and S are state variables; and v, 
p, and n are the corresponding co-state variables. 
The  first order conditions are obtained from BH/BC =  0,  BHl8uy =  0,8H/du~  = 
0,  BH/BK =  -v,  dH/dH = -b, and BH/BS = -+  respectively: 
The transversality conditions are: 
lim  v(t)K(t) =:  0, 
tdoo 
lim  p(t)H(t) =  0, 
t--roo 
lirn  lr(t)S(t) =  0. 
tdoo 
Defining  k  -=  K/H, s  S/H, c  EZ  C/H, and  y  2 Y/H,  the steady state 
conditions t/c = 0, k/k = 0, rS/s -;  0, hy/uy = 0, and uH/uH  = 0 may be 
simplified to the following: 
where YH  denotes the growth rate of  H. Combining these five equations and sim- 
plifying then yields the solutions shown in the main text. A.2  Social Capit a1  and Financial Development 
The solution to the social planner's problem is shown below,  The Harniltonian is 
given by: 
where C and uy are control variables, K and S are state variables, and v and IT are 
the corresponding co-state variables. 
The first-order conditions, obtained from aH/aC =  0, aH/auy =  0, 8HIBK = 
-6,:and  OHlaS =  -I?,  may be expressed as: 
where k =  KIL. 
Defining s z SIL, c r  CIL, and  y  YIL, the steady state conditions C/c, 
ilk  =  0, .+Is  =  0, and 'iLy/uy =  0 may be simplified to the following: 
Combining these four equations and simplifying then yields the solutions shown 
in the main text. 
A.3  Social Capital and  Innovations 
The solution to the social planner's problem is shown below.  The Hamiltonian is 
given by: where c, uy and UA are control variables; K,  A, and S are state variables; and v, p, 
and lr are the corresponding co-state variables. 
The  first order conditions are obtained from aH/aC =  0,  dH/auy =  0, ~H/~uA  = 
0, aH/aK -  -v,:aH/aA =  --fi,  and BH/8S =  -I?  respectively: 
where yA s 3  (UAL)~  SPA$-~ and 7s 
&om YA  = 3  (uAL)'  SPA$-^, we have 
In the steady state,  =  uA  =  0. Hence, 
&om ys = P (usL)" sd-lZX  -  6s, taking logs and time derivatives yields 
as qs =  0 in the steady state. Moreover, since us =  0 in the steady state, 
Solving for y~ and ys  simultaneously yields Defining % = KIAL, E G CIAL, and fj = YIAL, the steady state conditions 
A A 
A  A 
clc =  0, lelk =  0,  uy/uy =  0, and &/uA = 0 may be simplified to the following: 
Combining these four equations and simplifying then yields the solutions shown in 
the main text. 